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Bare	life:	asylum-seekers,	Australian	politics	and	Agamben’s	critique	of	violence
Fiona	Jenkins*
I	argue	here	that	we	may	gain	insight	into	the	political	challenges	posed	by	asylum	seekers	using	terms
supplied	by	Giorgio	Agamben’s	analysis	of	the	‘rotten	ambiguity’	of	modern	rule	of	law.	Appealing	to
the	language	of	human	rights	to	address	the	status	and	suffering	of	would-be	refugees	is	inadequate	to
the	extent	that	it	fails	to	interrogate	(1)	the	terms	on	which	‘belonging’	and	‘displacement’	are
politicised	in	the	nation	state	and	(2)	the	nihilistic	form	of	modern	law.	I	explore	these	limitations	by
locating	Agamben’s	thought	in	relation	to	that	of	Schmitt,	Benjamin	and	Arendt,	and	contrasting	his
account	of	the	‘state	of	exception’	in	which	we	live	with	a	perspective	that	would	invite	us	to	see	human
rights	as	redressing	excesses	of	sovereign	power.	My	discussion	leads	me	to	partially	endorse
Agamben’s	view	that	humanitarian	concern	for	refugee	entrenches	deeply	problematic	aspects	of	the
sovereign	power	of	the	nation	state.	I	also	argue,	however,	that	we	might	think	beyond	his	criticism	of
the	nation	state,	to	consider	how	democracy	would	need	to	be	reconceived	in	order	to	allow	the
political	claims	of	refugees	to	begin	to	be	heard	in	their	full	force.
The	camp	as	state	of	exception
The	detention	camps	of	Australia	hold	people	who	may	or	may	not	be	‘genuine’	refugees.	While	their
applications	for	refugee	status	are	processed,	men,	women	and	children	are	detained	in	conditions	that
range	from	the	uncomfortable	to	the	unsafe	and	intolerable.	That	‘they’,	as	the	responsible	Minister
often	puts	it,	are	referred	to	by	number	not	name,	is	just	one	dehumanising	aspect	of	their	situation.
Minimal	legal	representation	is	sometimes	available	but	rarely	facilitated.	Allegations	of	brutality	and
racism	on	the	part	of	security	ofϐicers	are	common	but	go	largely	unheeded	by	the	government.	Despite
criticism	by	respected	and	authoritative	international	agencies	following	inspections	of	these	camps,
the	Australian	Government	refuses	to	accept	that	there	are	reasonable	alternatives	to	its	detention
policy.	Indeed,	it	positively	attempts	to	reap	political	beneϐits	from	its	harsh	policy	towards	people	who
are	essentially	assumed	to	be	guilty	until	they	can	prove	themselves	innocent.	And	even	at	this	point	of
proof,	refugees	are	for	the	most	part	offered	not	citizenship,	but	the	provisional	accommodation	of
temporary	protection	visas.
How	might	we	understand	the	political	space	articulated	in	Australia	by	the	presence	and	the	practice
of	these	detention	camps,	neither	prisons	nor	places	of	protection,	neither	entirely	within	nor	entirely
outside	the	rule	of	law?	The	Italian	philosopher	Giorgio	Agamben	invites	us	to	take	a	very	serious	view
of	such	phenomena,	which	are	also	proliferating	in	Europe.	He	describes	the	space	of	the	camp	—	by
which	he	evokes	at	once	the	concentration	camp,	the	refugee	camp	and	the	detention	camp	—	as	‘the
materialization	of	the	state	of	exception	and	...	subsequent	creation	of	a	space	in	which	bare	life	and
juridical	rule	enter	into	a	threshold	of	indistinction’	(Agamben	1998,	174).	Although	the	terms
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Agamben	uses	are	often	difϐicult	to	grasp,	I	shall	argue	here	that	they	can	offer	us	fruitful	ways	of
thinking	about	the	signiϐicance	of	the	so	called	refugee	crisis	and	of	the	provisions	made	by
governments	such	as	that	of	Australia	in	relation	to	asylum	seekers.	Here	I	explore	Agamben’s	claim
that	it	is	important	to	look	at	what	remain	the	special	difϐiculties	of	those	who,	for	whatever	reason,
seek	to	leave	the	nation	state	to	which	they	are	deemed	to	properly	‘belong’,	in	terms	that	question	the
forms	of	sovereignty	under	which	we	all	live.
This	opens	a	set	of	questions	that	frame	my	discussion.	What	should	ground	our	sense	of	concern	over
the	existence	of	the	camp	and	thus	guide	the	character	of	our	response?	Do	humanitarian,	juridical	or
political	concerns	necessarily	cohere?	And	how	should	we	translate	an	immediate	sense	of	outrage	or
revulsion	at	what	is	taking	place	in	the	camp	into	an	argumentative	claim	about	why	what	happens
there	matters	for	‘us’,	where	the	‘us’	might	itself	be	a	controversial	category	to	bring	into	the	equation?
Human rights without exception
The	language	most	likely	to	be	used	in	articulating	the	sense	of	wrong	here	is	that	of	human	rights.
Human	rights	lie	at	the	core	of	the	liberal-democratic	aspiration	to	secure	equal	treatment	for	all	under
the	rule	of	law	and	they	appear	to	combine	humanitarian,	juridical	and	political	concerns	almost
seamlessly.	Savitri	Taylor	thoughtfully	reminds	us	of	the	words	of	Thomas	Paine:	‘He	that	would	make
his	own	liberty	secure	must	guard	even	his	enemy	from	oppression;	for	if	he	violates	this	duty,	he
establishes	a	precedent	that	will	reach	to	himself’	(Taylor	2002a,	396).	Focusing	in	particular	on	the
way	in	which	the	stranger	as	refugee	has	come	to	be	presented	politically	as	a	security	threat	through
the	conϐlation	of	this	ϐigure	with	that	of	the	stranger	as	terrorist,	she	argues	that:
The	best	way	for	the	members	of	a	liberal	society,	living	with	the	post-September	11	blurring	of	the
boundary	between	normalcy	and	emergency,	to	safeguard	the	rights	to	which	they	have	become
accustomed	is	by	insisting	that	the	principle	of	proportionality	be	applied	in	all	areas	of	national
security	activity.	In	the	present	context,	this	means	insisting	on	a	case-by-case	demonstration	that	the
cost	of	procedural	restrictions	on	the	individual	asylum-seeker	is	not	disproportionate	to	the
seriousness	and	likelihood	of	the	danger	to	Australia	of	permitting	that	particular	individual	in	those
particular	circumstances	access	to	the	usual	procedural	safeguards.	If	Australians	wonder	how
arbitrary	denial	of	procedural	safeguards	to	a	non-citizen,	the	obvious	‘other’,	can	be	a	threat	to	them,
consider	this:	the	‘Australian	community’	is	not	a	natural	and	immutable	group.	Our	history
demonstrates	that	the	outer	limits	of	our	sense	of	community	contract	in	the	face	of	war	and	other
political	crises	[Taylor	2002a,	IV].
Taylor	acknowledges	here	that,	as	Agamben	puts	it,	a	‘state	of	exception’	is	at	imminent	risk	of
prevailing	in	our	security	conscious	world	and	that	refugees	are	bearing	much	of	the	brunt	of	this	new
world	order	which	goes	by	the	name	of	the	‘war	on	terror’.	However,	unlike	Agamben,	Taylor	makes	a
powerful	case	for	responding	to	the	ways	in	which	‘liberalism	in	practice	falls	short	of	its	aspirations’
with	a	renewed	insistence	on	Enlightenment	values	(Taylor	2002b,	para	6).	Her	defence	of	the	principle
of	human	rights	is	politically	hard	headed,	invoking	not	sheer	generosity	towards	others	but	rather	the
recognition	that	the	very	existence	of	human	rights	requires	solidarity	in	their	defence;	that	human
rights	know	no	boundaries	or	differences	and	thus	as	in	Hegel’s	image	of	ethical	community,	what
damages	one	damages	all.	In	this	case,	however,	it	is	less	ethical	community	than	the	rule	of	law	which
demands	a	consistent	application	if	it	is	to	be	maintained	at	all.	We	are	each	at	risk	by	the
establishment	of	any	precedent	that	fails	to	respect	the	right	of	any	individual,	for	the	rule	reaches
beyond	that	instance	to	re-establish	itself	as	the	uniformity	of	human	wrong.
What	happens	in	the	detention	camp	would,	by	this	argument,	matter	to	‘us’	because	we	are	jointly
responsible	for	maintaining	precedents	of	just	conduct,	lest	injustice	become	the	rule.	As	human	rights
stand	or	fall	together,	our	true	security	as	subjects	of	such	rights	requires	us	to	determine,	on	a	case	by
case	basis,	what	each	individual	is	owed	by	law	in	terms	of	protection.	Here	competing	claims	as	to	the
nature	of	that	security	(the	security	of	the	individual	under	the	rule	of	law	versus	the	security	of	that
order	as	a	whole	when	under	threat	from	without)	and	claims	regarding	whose	protection	is	most
importantly	at	stake	at	any	time	(‘anyone	at	all’	or	‘us’),	must	be	further	weighed	according	to	an	open
ended	question	as	to	the	identity	of	the	Australian	community	which	seeks	to	protect	itself.	As	that
community	‘expands’	and	‘contracts’	its	understanding	of	who	is	to	be	included	as	a	subject	whose
claim	upon	it	is	to	be	taken	seriously,	the	boundaries	between	‘us’	and	‘them’	which	have	always
marked	not	only	the	sense	of	community	but	also	the	most	blatant	violence	to	the	principle	of	equal
consideration,	themselves	shift	and	re-form.
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Taylor,	then,	notes	certain	political	phenomena	of	the	contemporary	world	that,	as	we	will	see,	are	also
insisted	upon	by	Agamben;	but	what	she	remarks	here	is	the	need	for	a	constant	vigilance	to	keep	the
‘line	dividing	good	and	evil’	less	to	the	evil	side,	more	to	the	good,	without	considering	this	struggle	to
be	one	that	might	be	wholly	won,	but	not,	perhaps,	wholly	lost.	Although	there	are	competing	claims	to
be	judged	in	considering	questions	of	security,	belonging,	entitlement	and	so	forth,	these	can	and	must
be	fairly	judged	without	supposing	that	the	difϐiculties	of	so	doing	reveal	anything	inherently
problematic	in	the	rule	of	law	or	principle	of	national	sovereignty.	Indeed,	there	is	a	strong	sense	here
that	we	either	judge	according	to	well	established	precedent	and	the	criteria	provided	by	human	rights
or	we	give	way	to	unlimited	violence	and	arbitrariness.	According	to	Taylor,	to	accept	that	we	live	in	‘the
state	of	exception’,	or	that	normalcy	has	so	far	blurred	with	exceptionality	that	they	can	no	longer	be
readily	discerned,	is	to	give	in	far	too	readily	to	what	the	governments	united	in	a	‘war	on	terror’	would
like	us	to	think;	and	she	is	sharply	critical	of	Carl	Schmitt	(Taylor	2002b,	para	10,	2002a,	IV,	Schmitt
1932,	1985)	from	whom,	in	part,	Agamben	draws	the	political	language	he	uses	to	analyse	the	camp	as
‘the	materialization	of	the	state	of	exception’.	For	Taylor,	it	seems,	it	is	essential	that	we	continue	to
view	and	respond	to	the	current	harsh	treatment	of	refugees	and	those	detained	under	suspicion	as
exceptional	circumstances,	upon	which	the	‘normal’	rule	of	a	humanely	interpreted	order	of	rights
might	be	brought	to	bear.
In	contrast	with	Taylor’s	claims,	what	I	shall	present	here	is	a	partial	defence	of	Agamben’s	use	of	such
terms	as	‘state	of	exception’	in	bringing	to	light	aspects	of	the	situation	of	refugees	and	the	relation	that
the	existence	of	the	space	of	the	camp	bears	to	the	wider	political	body	of	the	nation.	In	particular,	I
shall	seek	to	clarify	how	his	claims	about	the	refugee	as	a	key	political	ϐigure	of	our	times	call	into
question	the	adequacy	of	a	language	of	human	rights	to	address	the	situation	of	the	‘unlawful
immigrant’,	one	whose	problematic	relation	to	the	rule	of	law	is	thought	by	Agamben	to	exemplify	a
crisis	we	cannot	ward	off	by	recourse	to	Enlightenment	values.	In	what	follows,	then,	I	shall	ϐirst
elaborate	something	of	the	structure	of	Agamben’s	thesis	and	then	examine	what	it	allows	us	to	bring
to	prominence	in	the	current	Australian	Government’s	policy	towards	asylum	seekers.
Inclusive exclusion: entwining good and evil
It	may	be	helpful	to	begin	by	citing	a	range	of	historical	examples	given	by	Agamben	to	indicate	the
breadth	of	the	concept	of	the	‘camp’	as	a	means	of	articulating	the	character	of	a	particularly
contemporary	political	space:
The	stadium	at	Bari	into	which	Italian	police	in	1991	provisionally	herded	all	illegal	Albanian
immigrants	before	sending	them	back	to	their	country,	the	winter	cycle	racing	track	in	which	the	Vichy
authorities	gathered	the	Jews	before	consigning	them	to	the	Germans,	the	Konzentrationslager	für
Ausländer	in	Cottbus-Sielow	in	which	the	Weimar	Government	gathered	Jewish	refugees	from	the	East,
or	the	zones	d’attentes	in	French	international	airports	in	which	foreigners	asking	for	refugee	status	are
detained	will	then	all	equally	be	camps.	In	all	these	cases,	an	apparently	innocuous	space	(for	example,
the	Hôtel	Arcades	in	Roissy)	actually	delimits	a	space	in	which	the	normal	order	is	de	facto	suspended
and	in	which	whether	or	not	atrocities	are	committed	depends	not	on	law	but	on	the	civility	and	ethical
sense	of	the	police	who	temporarily	act	as	sovereign	(for	example,	in	the	four	days	during	which
foreigners	can	be	held	in	the	zone	d’attente	before	the	intervention	of	the	judicial	authority)	[Agamben
1998,	174].
A	number	of	theses	are	compressed	into	this	set	of	examples	which	links	apparently	‘innocuous’	spaces
to	the	clearest	paradigms	of	evil	in	our	time.	All	are	characterised	as	situations	that	are	in	some	sense
extralegal	and	yet,	as	such,	reveal	what	Agamben	seeks	to	characterise	as	a	crucial	aspect	of	law	—	its
capacity	to	apply	‘even	in	withdrawing’	(1998,	28).	What	Agamben	refers	to	as	‘bare	life’	is	life	exposed
to	a	particular	potential	for	violence	occurring	in	what	is	most	often	considered	as	a	‘state	of	exception’
in	which	the	sovereign	power	of	decision	is	exercised	beyond	normal	juridical	processes.	Following
Schmitt,	however,	the	‘exceptional’	moment	of	extrajuridicality	is	deemed	the	foundation	of	all	‘rule	of
law’.	A	similar	double	move	situates	‘bare	life’,	ϔirst	as	that	which	is	excepted	from	the	rights	of
citizenship	but	then	second	as	that	which	is	included	in	citizenship,	according	to	a	logic	Agamben	dubs
that	of	‘inclusive	exclusion’.	An	appreciation	of	this	double	structure	of	argumentation	is	essential	to
interpreting	Agamben’s	thought.
Thus	we	may	notice,	ϐirst,	that	‘bare	life’	lacks	the	protected	political	status	conferred	by	citizenship.	In
this	context,	Agamben	reminds	us	that	the	action	undertaken	against	the	Jews	under	the	German	Third
Reich	was	from	start	to	ϐinish	conceived	of	entirely	as	a	police	operation	and	that	Jews	were	never
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‘processed’	until	they	had	been	fully	stripped	of	their	status	as	citizens	(Agamben	1998,	166ff).
Internment	was	classiϐied	as	a	preventative	police	measure	that	allowed	individuals	to	be	taken	into
custody	independently	of	any	criminal	behaviour,	solely	to	avoid	danger	to	the	security	of	the	state.	Yet
in	the	above	cited	passage,	Agamben	is	clearly	also	resisting	the	urge	to	view	the	Nazi	practice	as	an
aberration	of	the	modern	nation	state:	an	exception	that	ought,	if	anything,	to	prove	the	validity	of	the
rule	of	liberal	democracies	guided	by	respect	for	human	rights.	He	seeks	to	argue,	second,	that	a
potential	reduction	to	bare	life	is	implicit	in	modern	citizenship;	indeed	that	the	human	who	becomes
citizen	is	already	‘bare	life’,	given	that	the	principle	of	birth,	or	a	beginning	of	‘bare	life’,	grounds
entitlement	to	participation	in	the	nation	state.	In	a	reading	of	the	French	Declaration	of	the	Rights	of
Man	and	Citizen	of	1789,	Agamben	remarks	that	it	is	crucially	unclear	whether	‘the	two	terms	homme
and	citoyen	name	two	autonomous	beings	or	instead	form	a	unitary	system	in	which	the	ϐirst	is	always
already	included	in	the	second’	(1998,	127).	Agamben	claims	that	where	a	problematic	gap	appears
between	the	principle	of	birth	and	that	of	the	national	identity	of	the	citizen,	as	happened	in	the	‘lasting
crisis	following	the	devastation	of	Europe’s	geopolitical	order	after	the	First	World	War’,	Nazism	and
fascism	appear,	‘that	is,	two	properly	biopolitical	movements’	(1998,	129).	Agamben’s	thought	is
focused	upon	such	moments	of	crisis,	when	good	and	evil	begin	to	appear	as	continuous	with	one
another.
Similarly,	then,	the	camp	is	the	‘nomos	of	the	modern’	because	in	and	through	it,	at	this	time	of	crisis,
‘the	exception	becomes	the	rule’	(1998,	175).	The	camp	is	exemplary	of	the	biopolitical	logic	delineated
above,	and	like	‘bare	life’,	it	must	be	described	in	double	terms	as	at	once	rule	and	exception.	The	camp
is	thus	the	‘new	hidden	regulator	of	the	inscription	of	life	in	the	order’	and	‘sign	of	the	system’s	inability
to	function	without	being	transformed	into	a	lethal	machine’	(1998,	175).	The	camp	is	both	regulator
and	terminator.	Such	irreducible	complicity	of	law	with	violence	is,	in	many	ways,	the	starting	point	of
Agamben’s	reϐlections,	as	I	shall	outline	in	the	next	section.	It	leads	him	toward	the	thought	that	law
takes	‘life’	as	its	object,	so	that	the	‘bare	life’	that	inhabits	the	camp	and,	as	such,	exists	apparently
isolated	from	the	wider	citizenry,	is	not	an	isolatable	property	or	condition,	but	rather	a	‘threshold	in
which	law	passes	over	into	fact	and	fact	into	law,	and	in	which	the	two	planes	become
indistinguishable’	(1998,	171).	Where	‘bare	life	and	juridical	rule	enter	into	a	threshold	of
indistinction’,	‘politics	becomes	biopolitics	and	homo	sacer	is	virtually	confused	with	the	citizen’	(1998,
171);	the	modern	space	of	politics	is	thus	one	in	which,	given	‘zones	of	indistinction’,	a	constant	effort
bears	on	the	making	of	distinctions	that	will	secure	rights	that	can	be	imagined	to	apply	in	some	regular
and	universally	valid	fashion.	This	is	an	effort	Agamben	reads	as	ϐlawed	because	it	fails	to	recognise	the
existence	of	a	deeper	issue,	which	pertains	to	the	very	inability	of	the	modern	nation	state	to	isolate
‘bare	life’,	to	exclude	life	exposed	to	arbitrary	violence	without	recourse,	as	if	it	were	antithetical	to	the
life	of	the	citizen.	This	inability	matters	because,	Agamben	will	argue,	sovereignty	bears	an	essential
relation	to	such	‘exceptional’	violence	which	can	never	fully	be	transmuted	into	the	regular	system,
beyond	decision	and	exception,	in	which	the	rule	of	law	ϐinds	its	imaginary	form.
In	answer	then	to	the	question	as	to	why	the	existence	of	the	camp	should	matter	to	‘us’,	Agamben
evokes	an	ontological	issue	rather	than	a	principled	concern	to	preserve	the	universal	applicability	of
those	rights	designed	to	protect	each	of	us.	His	question	is:	what	does	the	existence	of	the	camp,	the
very	fact	of	its	possibility	in	all	its	many	forms,	show	about	us	as	a	biopolitical	form	of	life?	The
difference	here	from	something	like	Taylor’s	approach	is	highlighted	in	his	comment	on	Auschwitz,
which	he	clearly	intends	to	bear	a	more	general	import	for	the	camp	conceived	as	‘the	most	absolute
biopolitical	space	ever	to	have	been	realized’:
The	correct	question	to	pose	concerning	the	horrors	committed	in	the	camps	is,	therefore,	not	the
hypocritical	one	of	how	such	crimes	of	atrocity	could	be	committed	against	human	beings.	It	would	be
more	honest	and	more	useful	to	investigate	the	juridical	procedures	and	deployments	of	power	by
which	human	beings	could	be	so	completely	deprived	of	their	rights	and	prerogatives	that	no	act
committed	against	them	could	appear	any	longer	as	a	crime	[1998,	171].
Agamben’s	point	—	which	takes	him	beyond	a	familiar	response	to	the	moral	wrong	of	the	camp,
conceived	as	a	wrong	against	an	ideal	rule	of	equal	and	respectful	treatment	of	human	beings	—	is	that
the	very	existence	of	the	camp	reveals	a	sphere	of	possibility	in	the	modern	state	whose	apparently
‘exceptional’	status	we	should	call	into	question.	The	camp	is	conceived	precisely	as	a	‘hybrid	of	fact
and	law	in	which	the	two	have	become	indistinguishable’	(1998,	170),	forming	a	constitutive	limit	to
Enlightenment	political	thought.	To	question	here	is	to	reϐlect	on	the	very	notions	of	humanity,
citizenship	and	the	rule	of	law	within	the	modern	nation	state	which	are	supposed	to	deϐine	the	camp
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as	exceptional.	Thus,	for	Agamben,	to	turn	only	to	human	rights	in	addressing	the	situation	of	refugees,
without	also	attempting	to	think	beyond	them,	is	to	fail	to	recognise	that:
the	fates	of	human	rights	and	the	nation-state	are	bound	together	such	that	the	decline	and	crisis	of	one
necessarily	implies	the	end	of	the	other.	The	refugee	must	be	considered	for	what	he	is:	nothing	less
than	a	limit	concept	that	radically	calls	in	question	the	fundamental	categories	of	the	nation-state,	from
the	birth-nation	to	the	man-citizen	link	...	[1998,	134].
I	shall	now	turn	to	Agamben’s	elaboration	of	this	set	of	claims.	It	is	clearly	highly	provocative	to	link	the
crimes	committed	in	the	concentration	camps	of	the	Nazi	regime	with	contemporary	responses	to
those	who	claim	they	are	refugees.	Nevertheless,	Agamben’s	critical	political	ontology	raises	important
questions	about	Australia’s	policy	of	mandatory	detention	of	‘unlawful	immigrants’.	In	particular,	it
reveals	certain	difϐiculties	involved	in	relying	on	a	language	of	human	rights	to	object	to	this	policy:	but
it	will	do	so	only	to	the	degree	that	we	accept	some	of	Agamben’s	presuppositions	about	the	‘nihilism’
of	modernity:	a	nihilism	he	ϐinds	at	work	in	many	of	the	political	landscapes	we	currently	inhabit.
Human rights and modern nihilism
Agamben’s	thought	that	the	camp	is	the	‘materialization	of	the	state	of	exception’	points	to	the	exercise
of	violence	which	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	enforceability	of	the	rule	of	law,	raising	issues	that,	in	turn,
must	be	linked	to	the	question	of	law’s	authority.	Agamben	suggests	that	the	‘state	of	emergency	has
become	the	rule’	because	‘all	power,	whether	democratic	or	totalitarian,	traditional	or	revolutionary,
has	entered	into	a	legitimation	crisis	in	which	the	state	of	exception,	which	was	the	hidden	foundation
of	the	system,	has	fully	come	to	light’	(Agamben	1999,	170,	contrast	Schmitt	1985,	15,	Benjamin	1968,
257).	Agamben	here	follows	a	trajectory	of	thought	implicit	in	Benjamin’s	transformation	of	Schmitt’s
thesis	that	sovereign	power	is	an	exercise	of	juridical	power	at	once	inside	and	outside	the	law	into	a
thesis	about	the	contemporary	crisis	of	legitimation	or	‘nihilism’.	To	set	the	liberal	principle	of
consistent	application	at	the	heart	of	the	rule	of	law	against	the	potentially	dictatorial	power	exercised
in	decision	on	the	state	of	exception	is	not	an	option	for	Agamben	because	this	response	can	only
address	the	legitimation	crisis	of	the	modern	world	in	a	circular	fashion.	Such	circularity	is	most	clearly
portrayed	in	Habermas’	demonstration	of	the	internal	relation	of	the	rule	of	law	and	democracy,	in
which	the	‘substance’	of	a	deliberatively	conceived	popular	sovereignty	is	presented	as	lending	body	to
the	formal	rule	of	law,	while	the	rule	of	law	provides	the	conditions	under	which	individual	protection
can	support	universal	security	(Habermas	1998).	This	type	of	response	to	the	modern	problem	of
legitimation,	which	might	also	be	conceived	in	terms	of	the	proportional	consideration	of	the	interests
of	a	‘people’	and	those	of	‘individuals’,	is	most	problematic	for	Agamben	at	the	very	point	at	which	it
appears	to	secure	equal	and	inclusive	consideration	of	all	human	beings	as	ends	in	themselves.
In	his	Critique	of	Violence,	Benjamin	(1997)	argues	that	a	‘rotten	ambiguity’	lies	within	the	modern	rule
of	law,	since	while	it	justiϐies	its	use	of	violence	as	means	to	legitimated	ends,	such	ends	can	never	be
fully	separated	from	means.	This	ensures	a	perpetual	slippage	between	law	as	a	means	to	preserve	the
end	of	human	dignity	and	law	as	means	whose	justiϐication	lies	in	the	self-preservation	of	the	very
sovereignty	of	law	—	its	capacity	to	determine	justice	and	to	exercise	its	‘force’	accordingly.	Although
the	principle	of	respect	for	humanity	as	end	in	itself	can	provide	a	‘minimal	programme’	for	the	critique
of	a	legal	order,	in	the	end	it	is	unable	to	address	the	speciϐic	problem	posed	by	the	self	afϐirmation	of
that	legal	order	as	sovereignty.	This	problem	is	exhibited	particularly	in	‘police	actions’	that	enforce	the
law	in	a	way	that	can	as	well	be	understood	as	lying	outside	as	within	the	legal	order	(Benjamin	1997,
287).	Where	issues	of	national	security	are	held	to	be	at	stake,	the	principle	that	the	legal	order	serves
the	preservation	of	each	individual	as	‘end	in	themselves’	can	be	turned	to	legitimate	any	kind	of	means
(Benjamin	1989,	283).	The	worry	is	that	the	very	logic	of	end-means	thinking	at	work	in	seeking	to
ensure	that	law	operates	as	a	reasonable	means	to	valid	ends	is	ultimately	politically	impotent	where
structures	of	legitimacy	themselves	are	in	the	process	of	collapse.
Agamben’s	reϐlections	on	the	camp	as	‘nomos	of	the	modern’	locate	the	crisis	of	the	nation	state,
involving	the	problem	of	dealing	with	massive	numbers	of	refugees,	in	a	constellation	of	contemporary
sites	of	‘rotten	ambiguity’.	These	sites	are	linked,	on	the	one	hand,	to	the	relation	between	the	modern
democratic	nation	state	and	ethnicity	taken	as	a	principle	of	a	people’s	unity	and,	on	the	other	hand,	to
the	emphasis	on	the	principle	of	human	dignity	which	lends	shape	to	those	universal	human	rights	that
aim	to	transcend	and	regulate	ethnic	particularity.	Two	points,	then,	are	key:	(1)	his	reϐlections	on	the
existence	of	camps	highlight	the	importance	of	a	crisis	affecting	the	imaginary	basis	of	the	modern
nation-state	in	the	principle	of	ethnic	identity;	(2)	his	characterisation	of	‘homo	sacer’	develops
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Benjamin’s	reϐlections	in	the	‘Critique	of	Violence’	concerning	the	modern	principle	of	the	‘sanctity	of
life’	—	human	life’s	sacredness	or	inherent	dignity	—	and	follows	in	raising	questions	about	how	far
such	a	notion	can	take	us	in	offering	a	critique	of	violence.
Agamben	aims	to	demonstrate	that	‘sacredness’	can	be	understood	with	reference	to	the	‘homo	sacer’
of	Roman	Law.	The	subject	of	law	is	then	cast	not	as	the	inviolable	moral	individual	possessed	of
Kantian	dignity	but	one	whose	life	is	‘sacred’	in	the	sense	of	being	exposed	to	violence	without
recourse.	‘Sacred’	life	suffers,	like	the	‘human’	of	human	rights,	from	a	fundamental	equivocality,
introducing	into	law	a	‘zone	of	indistinguishability’	(Agamben	1998,	8).	Paradoxically,	it	is	not	simply
the	privileged	status	of	‘life’s	sanctity’	we	must	consider	as	being	that	which	orientates	the	respect
afforded	to	human	life	but	also,	at	once,	the	radically	exposed	status	of	the	sacred	man,	one	who	stands
outside	the	provisions	of	law.	‘Sacred	life’	is	simply	that	in	relation	to	which	a	legal	order	deϔines	itself,
afϐirming	its	pure	sovereignty	as	such.	Crucially,	what	is	excluded	in	founding	that	order	(the	outlaw,
terrorist	or	refugee,	or	the	‘sacred	man’	in	the	Roman	sense)	does	not	bear	a	merely	external	relation	to
what	is	‘inside’,	but	is,	rather,	constitutive	of	sovereignty.	The	(non)status	of	homo	sacer	or	one	to	whom
the	law	applies	in	withdrawing	—	by	suspension	of	the	juridical	order’s	validity	—	does	not	stand,
therefore,	in	a	simple	relation	of	exteriority	to	the	political	community,	but	is	an	‘inclusive	exclusion’.
The	important	consequence	for	our	purposes	here	is	that	homo	sacer	occupies	a	luminal	zone	that	may
either	give	form	to	the	political	community	or	threaten	it	with	the	incursion	of	a	zone	of	indistinction	in
which	all	stand	under	the	sovereign	‘ban’	—	a	zone	in	which	all	stand	guilty	even	if	not	accused.	It	is	the
latter	incursion	that	characterises	contemporary	times	in	which	all	human	life	is	deemed	‘sacred’	and
where	this	metaphysics	translates	into	the	discourse	of	human	rights.	We	now	all	stand	under	what
alleges	to	be	a	universal	and	comprehensive	law.	Yet	for	Agamben,	Kaϐka’s	novel,	The	Trial,	with	its
hero’s	exposure	to	the	absolute	force	of	law	without	any	speciϐic	determination	of	crime	or	culpability,
displays	the	underside	of	this	situation.	The	echoes	of	the	Kaϐkaesque	in	the	contemporary	experience
of	‘unlawful	immigrants’	are	inextricably	bound	up	with	a	world	of	juridico-political	destitution,	as
law’s	legitimacy	retreats	into	the	pure	formality	of	the	abstract	universal.
The refugee as limit concept
Agamben	holds	that	the	refugee	is	‘nothing	less	than	a	limit	concept	that	radically	calls	into	question
the	fundamental	categories	of	the	nation	state’	(Agamben	1998,	134).	The	refugee	takes	on	a
fundamental	political	importance	within	a	context	in	which	a	key	legitimating	form	in	modernity	—	the
nation	state	—	is	imagined	to	be	collapsing.
On	this	point	it	is	important	to	note	the	afϐinities	and	differences	between	Agamben’s	thought	and	that
of	Hannah	Arendt,	in	analysing	the	manifest	difϐiculty	of	applying	human	rights	to	those	who	lack	the
protection	afforded	by	citizenship	and	membership	in	a	particular	state.	Regarding	the	treatment	of
stateless	persons	in	the	period	between	the	two	wars,	Arendt	comments	in	The	Origins	of
Totalitarianism	that	the	notion	of	human	rights	here	lacked	force	in	a	manner	she	links	to	the	minimal
characterisation	of	a	person	that	is	conveyed	by	being	‘merely	human’.	This	human	quality,	posited	as
‘all’	that	a	person	is,	readily	transmutes	into	a	certain	invisibility,	a	certain	being	of	no	account:
The	conception	of	human	rights	based	upon	the	assumed	existence	of	a	human	being	as	such,	broke
down	at	the	very	moment	when	those	who	professed	to	believe	in	it	were	for	the	ϐirst	time	confronted
with	people	who	had	indeed	lost	all	other	qualities	and	speciϐic	relationships	—	except	that	they	were
still	human	[Arendt	1951,	290-295].
In	her	own	work,	Arendt	addresses	this	issue	by	arguing	that	underwriting	human	rights	there	must
always	be	the	guarantee	of	political	capacity	—	the	‘right	to	have	rights’.	At	ϐirst	reading,	Agamben	here
seems	to	echo	Arendt	in	claiming	that	humanitarian	responses	to	refugees	might	submerge	other
responses,	and	turn	attention	away	from	political	issues,	since	the	status	of	the	subject	of	‘merely’
human	rights	transcends	them.	Thus	he	writes:
The	separation	between	humanitarianism	and	politics	that	we	are	experiencing	today	is	the	extreme
phase	of	the	separation	of	the	rights	of	man	from	the	rights	of	the	citizen.	In	the	ϐinal	analysis,	however,
humanitarian	organizations	...	can	only	grasp	human	life	in	the	ϐigure	of	bare	or	sacred	life,	and,
therefore,	despite	themselves,	maintain	a	secret	solidarity	with	the	very	powers	they	ought	to	ϐight
[Agamben	1998,	133].
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Agamben,	however,	is	sceptical	about	the	Arendtian	idea	that	political	capacity	can	only	reside	in	the
participation	of	a	citizen	in	a	republic	of	peers.	He	responds	to	what	Arendt	identiϐies	as	the	problem	of
the	equivocal	status	of	the	‘fully	human’,	but	thus	‘merely	human	and	no	more’	that	marks	the	discourse
of	human	rights,	not	by	attempting	to	envisage	a	political	form	beyond	the	nation	state	in	which	the
‘right	to	have	rights’	might	be	grounded,	but,	on	the	contrary,	by	articulating	a	radical	critique	of	the
modern	language	of	rights.	The	second	line	of	thought	he	pursues,	therefore,	is	one	that	suggests	that
not	only	the	lack	of	viable	political	rights	for	refugees	but	even	the	rights	of	citizens	themselves	must	be
understood	as	ultimately	constructed	upon	a	crucial	conception	of	the	human	as	‘bare’	or	‘sacred’	life,
the	‘inclusive	exclusion’	of	which	is	the	‘secret’	premise	of	sovereign	power.	Agamben	agrees	with
Arendt	that	there	is	a	signiϐicant	exclusion	of	‘bare	life’	from	the	political	body	of	the	citizenry	and	here,
accordingly,	‘merely	human’	rights	reside.	Yet	he	goes	beyond	this	thought	to	claim	that	even	within	the
separation	of	the	rights	of	man	from	the	rights	of	the	citizen,	a	problem	will	arise	for	any	attempt	to	link
the	‘right	to	have	rights’	to	an	imagined	participation	in	a	notional	republic.	Here,	again,	everything
most	original	and	controversial	in	Agamben’s	thought	occurs	in	the	second	gesture	of	analysis.	The
political	impotence	of	appeals	to	human	rights	relate	to	what	Agamben	calls	the	biopolitical	character
of	sovereignty,	the	entwining	of	sovereignty	with	a	power	over	life	and	death	that	becomes	in
modernity	the	power	to	‘make	survive’	that	he	detects	in	all	humanitarian	concerns.
‘Sanctity	of	life’	and	‘dignity’	are	not	metaphysical	properties	of	the	human,	nor	ends	in	terms	of	which
certain	means	might	be	justiϐied,	but	serve	a	complex	biopolitical	function,	in	which	ends	and	means
pass	into	one	another.	This	is	the	point	at	which	Agamben	focuses	his	critique	of	rights:
It	is	time	to	stop	regarding	declarations	of	rights	as	proclamations	of	eternal,	meta-juridical	values
binding	the	legislator	(in	fact,	without	much	success)	to	respect	eternal	ethical	principles,	and	to	begin
to	consider	them	according	to	their	real	historical	function	in	the	modern	nation-state.	Declarations	of
right	represent	the	original	ϐigure	of	natural	life	in	the	juridico-political	order	of	the	nation-state.	The
same	bare	life	that	in	the	ancient	regime	was	politically	neutral	and	belonged	to	God	as	creaturely	life
and	in	the	classical	world	was	(at	least	apparently)	clearly	distinguished	as	zoé	from	political	life	(bios)
now	fully	enters	into	the	structure	of	the	state	and	even	becomes	the	earthly	foundation	of	the	state’s
legitimacy	and	sovereignty	[1998,	127].
Polemical	as	these	claims	no	doubt	are	and	open	as	they	are	to	contestation	from	a	variety	of
perspectives	which	do	not	conceive	of	rights	as	‘eternal,	meta-juridical	values	binding	the	legislator’,
the	useful	point	they	allow	Agamben	to	open	out	concerns	the	relation	between	declarations	of	rights
and	the	nation	state.	In	a	zone	of	indistinction,	the	difference	between	those	who	are	‘men	and	citizens’
as	opposed	to	those	who	are	merely	‘human’	is	repeatedly	and	insistently	redelineated	as	the	task	of
modern	biopolitics	par	excellence.	It	is	here,	in	this	zone	of	rotten	ambiguity	that	Agamben	would	invite
us	to	consider	the	contemporary	plight	of	the	world’s	asylum	seekers.	The	refugee	is	a	limit	concept
because	of	a	crisis	posed	for	sovereignty	by	the	proliferation	of	displacements	of	an	ethnic	particularity
that	can	no	longer	be	contained	within	the	abstract	formalism	of	human	rights.
What	does	Agamben	help	us	to	see?
A	key	aspect	of	the	Enlightenment	imaginary	is	its	assumption	of	a	uniform	justice	that	might	in
principle	extend	indeϐinitely	to	all	the	peoples	of	the	world.	Benjamin’s	thought	about	the	law’s	‘rotten
ambiguity’	in	relation	to	violence	(extended	by	Agamben	as	reϐlection	on	‘homo	sacer’)	brings	an
important	critical	edge	to	bear	on	that	assumption.	However,	given	the	contentious	character	of	many
of	Agamben’s	views,	which	are	often	as	insensitive	as	Enlightenment	discourse	itself	to	the	complex
genealogies	and	contradictions	informing	the	history	and	efϐicacy	of	rights	claims,	it	is	clearly
worthwhile	attempting	to	think	against	and	beyond	the	analysis	Agamben	offers.
The	key	point	I	wish	to	take	from	Agamben’s	analysis,	for	now,	is	the	thought	that	there	are	certain
injustices	and	forms	of	violence	in	the	contemporary	world	that	are	not	being	and	perhaps	cannot	be
resolved	within	currently	prevailing	juridico-political	frames.	The	case	of	refugees,	as	Arendt	shows,	is
difϐicult	to	approach	from	within	the	interpretation	of	rights	that	effectively	upholds	and	enforces	them
primarily	as	the	rights	of	citizens,	so	that	those	eligible	for	the	universal	inclusiveness	of	merely
‘human’	rights	already	constitute	an	exception	to	the	norm.	Moreover,	I	ϐind	it	plausible	to	argue	that
we	should	view	the	kind	of	crisis	in	legitimation	that	has	appeared	around	the	whole	question	of	the
treatment	of	‘unlawful	immigrants’	(richly	exploited	by	governments	worldwide	to	afϐirm	and	assert
their	national	sovereignty)	as	a	crisis	that	we	have	to	respond	to	in	ways	that	require	us	to	think	and
act	beyond	the	familiar	Enlightenment	project	of	resecuring	the	rule	of	law.	The	countless	stateless
people	today,	displaced	in	a	world	that	insists	on	certain	narrowly	deϐined	ideas	of	what	constitutes
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‘belonging’	and	what	being	‘placed’	or	‘displaced’	entails,	remind	us	that	this	‘beyond’	of	order	is
already	inhabited	by	suffering.	To	this	problem,	inclusion	in	the	quasi-citizenship	of	the	world	evoked
by	human	rights	may	ultimately	prove	a	thoroughly	inadequate	response	—	even	if	we	may
simultaneously	afϐirm	that	for	the	present	there	is	none	better.
What	does	Agamben’s	analysis	invite	us	to	consider	most	important	in	the	response	of	the	Australian
Government	to	asylum	seekers	today?	First,	perhaps,	the	Kaϐkaesque	logic	that	so	often	enters	into
their	situation.	Unlawful	immigrants	fall	‘outside’	the	law	in	a	number	of	ways.	If,	for	instance,	they	are
to	be	eligible	for	the	protection	of	international	law,	they	must	ϐirst	prove	themselves	to	be	genuinely
entitled	to	be	classed	as	refugees.	Arriving	on	Australia’s	shores	before	ϐirst	acquiring	permission	to	do
so	positions	them	as	‘unlawful’	in	their	actions.	Absence	of	proof	as	to	one’s	entitlement	to	enjoy
protection	under	the	law	does	indeed	allow	for	‘interim’	status	and	corresponding	rights.	Conϐinement
in	detention	camps,	however,	coupled	with	the	prevailing	political	rhetoric	casting	doubt	upon	the
integrity	of	claimants	for	asylum	and	the	undertaking	of	actions	that	seek	to	prevent	potential	refugees
from	becoming	a	speciϐic	claim	upon	Australia,	all	conϐirm	that	‘outlaw’	status	remains	the	primary
marker	of	detention	camp	inhabitants;	and	thus	in	Agamben’s	terms,	we	would	view	them	most
adequately	as	standing	before	the	law	in	its	totality	and	not	under	any	of	its	speciϐic	provisions.
The	Kaϐkaesque	elements	of	this	situation	—	consider	the	favourite	government	image	of	the	‘queue
jumper’,	when	it	is	quite	clear	that	often	enough	there	is	simply	no	queue	to	join	—	would	be	linked	by
Agamben	to	a	wider	difϐiculty	in	the	application	of	a	jurisdiction	that	has	become	a	structure	‘in	force
without	signiϐicance’.	His	analysis	requires	us	to	consider	as	salient	to	all	issues	raised	by	asylum
seekers,	the	nihilism	of	contemporary	politics	in	Australia.	For	Agamben,	the	nation	state	and	the	‘limit
ϐigure	of	the	refugee’	are	bound	together	in	the	unravelling	of	ϐictions	that	have	lost	their	persuasive
power	and,	for	this	very	reason,	must	be	violently	reasserted	by	those	who	exercise	sovereignty.	The
lack	of	any	real	differences	between	the	major	political	parties,	presenting	middle	ground,	somewhat
paranoid	consensus,	in	lieu	of	any	deeper	answers	to	problems	of	justiϐication	of	current	action	or	of
the	vision	of	future	communities,	signals	that	the	real	situation	of	political	crisis	is	being	masked	as	the
crisis	presented	by	a	threatened	‘inϐlux’	of	illegals	(see	Badiou	2003,	for	discussion	of	the	interplay	of
parallel	political	phenomena	in	France).
The	violent	defence	of	a	principle	of	sovereignty	attached	to	the	right	to	regulate	the	borders	of	the
nation	has	become	the	dominant	aspect	of	response	to	the	so	called	‘crisis’	posed	for	Australia	by
asylum	seekers.	If	this	implies	a	wider	crisis	of	the	nation	state	form,	then	it	is	important,	as	Taylor
remarks,	to	consider	carefully	whether	we	who	would	criticise	what	the	government	makes	of	this
should	ourselves	highlight	the	exceptional	character	of	this	moment.	As	with	the	‘war	on	terror’,	this
threat	to	security	is	uniformly	ϐigured	as	a	crisis	posed	to	order	as	such	rather	than	as	a	part	of	the
normal	order	of	events.	What	not	so	long	ago	might	have	been	viewed	as	the	everyday	regulation	of
borders,	vulnerable	by	their	very	nature	to	a	certain	predictable	level	of	breaching,	now	takes	on	the
character	of	the	protection	of	frontiers,	whose	policing	demands	an	exceptional	and	decisive	response
on	the	part	of	the	government.
But	does	afϐirming	the	exceptional	character	of	this	moment	simply	play	into	the	hands	of	a
government	keen	to	assert	its	right	to	decide	in	the	state	of	exception	beyond	the	rule	of	law?
Agamben’s	point	here	is	subtly	different	from	any	such	endorsement	of	the	principle	of	sovereignty,	and
this	precisely	insofar	as	his	political	analysis	follows	Benjamin	and	not	Schmitt.	Agamben	tries	to	show
that	we	live	in	times	in	which	‘the	exception	has	already	become	the	rule’.	His	thought	is	that	the
positive	dynamic	relationship	between	the	rule	of	law	and	democracy	begins	to	founder	with	the
breakdown	of	disavowed	relations	of	ethnic	belonging	and	inclusion	that	constitute	its	economy.	A
critique	of	Australian	politics	inspired	by	his	thought	might	therefore	highlight	the	logic	of	an
exceptionality,	which,	in	conϔirming	the	rule,	functions	normatively.	If	‘unlawful	immigrants’	present	us
with	a	crisis,	then	what	we	are	asked	to	imagine	as	normative	is	a	world	in	which	everyone	stays	in
their	‘proper’	place;	and	the	regulation	by	exclusion	of	those	who	do	not	belong	is	also	constitutive	of
the	regulation	of	those	who	do.	It	is	the	terms	of	this	underlying	political	ontology	that	Agamben’s
thought	exposes	as	important	and	problematic.
Beyond Agamben: reconfiguring democracy?
Is	it	possible,	however,	that	the	ideology	of	‘belonging’	that	ϐigures	the	presence	of	the	people	in	a
nation	state	might	be	rethought	or	undone	in	relation	to	democracy:	a	democracy	now	severed	from
the	principle	of	sovereignty	enshrined	in	the	nation	state?	For	not	only	the	nation	state	but	also	any
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familiar	conception	of	democracy	would	seem	to	entail	difϐiculties	in	welcoming	those	who	do	not
already,	by	some	clearly	identiϐiable	standard,	‘belong’	to	the	demos	(a	point	made	much	of	by	Schmitt
in	his	reϐlections	upon	the	friend/enemy	opposition).	It	is	noteworthy	that	in	a	manner	that	echoes	in	a
signiϐicant	way	the	current	politicisation	of	the	‘response	to	terrorism’,	unlawful	immigrants	are
represented	as	a	threat	to	the	maintenance	of	‘our’	democracy,	which	is	here	identiϐied	with	the	terms
of	‘our’	political	order	and	speciϐies	‘sovereignty’	as	the	sovereignty	of	the	people.	This	is,	ϐirst,	because
they	(‘others’)	are	imagined	as	belonging	to	and	bearing	with	them	‘undemocratic’	ways	of	life	and
cultures;	but	second,	because	their	very	presence	within	the	boundaries	of	the	nation	and	their	being
‘out	of	place’	there	calls	into	question	who	the	people	are.
But	who	rightfully	belongs	to	the	demos	that	is	the	basis	for	democracy	and	who	is	properly	excluded
from	it?	Can	we	imagine	democracy	as	a	political	form	in	which	a	future	community,	no	longer	based
upon	the	exclusivity	of	a	‘people’,	might	become	possible?	Can	democracy	possibly	renew	the	terms	of
legitimacy	to	accommodate	those	whose	place	is	to	be	displaced?
In	this	task	of	legitimation,	the	outsider,	asylum	seeker	or	refugee	must	play	a	highly	ambiguous	and
thus	potentially	disruptive	and	emancipatory	role.	Bonnie	Honig,	in	her	book	exploring	this	theme,
comments	that	various	versions	of	a	myth	of	‘immigrant	America’	in	circulation	‘all	seek	to
renationalize	the	state	and	to	position	it	at	the	centre	of	any	future	democratic	politics’.	The	foreigner
may	thereby	be	positioned	in	one	of	two	ways:	xenophilically	as	‘giver’	to	the	nation,	recharging	the
nation	with	cultural	energy	and,	even	more	importantly,	as	one	who	endorses	the	myth	of	a	social
contract	by	choosing	democracy,	or	xenophobically	as	‘taker’,	parasite	on	the	nation’s	resources	and	one
who	places	democracy	at	risk	by	adding	cultural	elements	to	the	social	mix	that	prevent	it	from
acquiring	the	level	of	homogeneity	demanded	by	the	demos.	In	either	case	he	or	she	is	pressed	into
service	as	an	element	in	the	nation’s	‘iconic	economy’.	‘Indeed,’	she	remarks,	‘the	xenophilic	insistence
that	immigrants	are	givers	to	the	nation	itself	feeds	the	xenophobic	anxiety	that	they	might	really	be
takers	from	it’	(Honig	2001,	99).
To	counter	this	pattern,	Honig	suggests	that	we	begin	to	think	about	immigrants	in	relation	to
democracy,	rather	than	the	nation,	and	to	think	about	‘taking’	as	the	very	thing	that	immigrants	have	to
give	us.	For	the	birth	of	democracies	such	as	that	of	America	cannot	be	characterised	by	a	people	having
rights	bestowed	upon	them	(by	a	sovereign	power);	they	are,	rather,	established	through	the	polemical
appropriation	or	seizing	of	rights.	Here,	I	want	to	suggest,	we	have	an	approximation	to	the	‘politics	of
pure	means’	called	for	by	both	Benjamin	and	Agamben.	The	new	myth	of	an	immigrant	America	that
Honig	proposes	is	characterised	by	a	‘democratic	activism	whose	heroes	are	not	nationals	of	the	regime
but	insist,	nonetheless,	on	exercising	national	citizen	rights’.	The	peculiarly	democratic	aspect	of	this
myth	‘lies	not	in	its	aspiration	to	tell	a	story	of	ever	broadening	national	inclusion’	but	rather	in	relating
a	‘history	and	a	continuing	present	of	empowerment,	frame	shifting,	and	world	building’.	‘We	have
here,’	she	writes,	‘a	story	of	illegitimate	demands	made	by	people	with	no	right	to	make	them,	a	story	of
people	so	far	outside	the	circle	of	who	“counts”	that	they	cannot	make	claims	within	the	existing	frames
of	claim-making.’	Their	democratic	action	simply	consists	in	the	staging	of	‘non-existing’	rights,	by
means	of	which	the	chance	at	least	exists	that	new	rights	will	come	into	being	(Honig	2001,	101).
Is	this,	perhaps,	the	form	of	demand	we	have	heard	from	those	incarcerated	at	Woomera	and	at	other
detention	centres	around	Australia?	And	if	we	rely	solely	upon	extending	the	rule	of	law	to	offer
equitable	treatment	to	such	people,	without	at	the	same	time	profoundly	calling	into	question	the
political	contexts	in	which	the	decision	integral	to	all	application	of	the	law	is	irreducibly	bound	up,	do
we	do	justice	to	their	claim?	If	the	analysis	I	have	elaborated	here	holds	at	all,	the	persistent,	ongoing
political	exclusion	and	holding	exposed	to	violence	of	precisely	those	at	whom	humanitarian	concern	is
directed	is	not	merely	a	side	effect	of	the	given	global	order	but	is	constitutive	of	powers	of	sovereignty
and	thus,	in	turn,	inseparable	from	a	certain	rotten	ambiguity	of	the	law.	My	suggestion	here,	then,	is
that	if	we	are	to	imagine	a	democracy	adequate	to	the	suffering	inhabiting	the	margins	of	our	global
order,	we	must	seek	to	transform	the	very	context	in	which	it	is	claimed	as	the	modern	form	of
legitimation	and	do	so	in	contestation	of	the	logic	of	sovereignty	exercised	no	less	in	the	camps	in	our
midst	than	at	the	borders	of	our	nations.
Our	challenge,	perhaps,	is	this	—	to	ϐind	a	way	to	cast	the	protests	of	those	incarcerated	at	Woomera	as
political	protests,	as	the	speech	concerning	justice	and	injustice	upon	which	Aristotle	held	political
community	to	be	properly	based.	Can	we	allow	the	demand	for	justice	we	encounter	in	the	claims	of
refugees	to	play	a	critical	role	in	reconceiving	our	own	entitlements	and	the	entitlements	of	others,	not
only	as	speaking	to	the	principle	of	the	equity	of	modern	law,	but	also	as	the	problematic	claims	of	the
members	of	a	democracy	to	come?	The	demand	is	ambitious.	But	the	challenge	it	addresses	is	indeed
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posed	by	refugees,	the	challenge	in	our	time	to	begin	to	conceive	the	global	and	deeply	problematic
terms	of	our	belonging	and	displacement	in	a	common	world.	l
*	Lecturer	in	Philosophy,	Australian	National	University.
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